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THE SENSORY PRESENTATION
OF DIVINE INFINITY*
Edward L. Schoen

Reliable as well as unreliable indicators playa crucial role in various types of ordinary perceptual encounter. Since perceptual indicators may function perfectly well without any
connection whatever to essences or essential natures, it is possible to find ways in which
divine infinity may be perceptually encountered and even recognized as such in the course
of ordinary human experience.

About two decades ago, John Hick accepted verificationist criteria as reasonable
standards by which to judge the factual meaningfulness of utterances. In his
Faith and Knowledge, he noted that the details of Christian conceptions of God
present several particularly difficult problems for verificationists. According to
Hick, one of these problems arises from the fact that
God is described in Christian theology in terms of various absolute qualities, such as omnipotence, omnipresence, perfect goodness, infinite
love, etc., which cannot as such be observed by us, as can their finite
analogues, limited power, local presence, finite goodness, and human
love. One can recognize that a being whom one 'encounters' has a given
finite degree of power, but how does one recognize that he has unlimited
power? How does one observe that an encountered being is omnipresent?
How does one perceive that his goodness and love, which one can perhaps see to exceed any human goodness and love, are actually infinite?
Such qualities cannot be given in human experience.'
Of course, the dramatic demise of the Positivist program has stripped the context
of this argument of its original vitality. In recent years, verifiability criteria for
cognitive meaningfulness as well as Hick's creative struggles to meet such criteria
have lost much of their attraction. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to dismiss
the content of this passage along with its original context. After all, the fundamental desire to trace evidential links between the ordinary course of human experience and religious belief remains as powerful as ever. 21f Hick is correct in his
contentions, formidable barriers lie in the path of those who would seek experiential access to a God that conforms to the descriptions of traditional Christian
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theology. According to Hick, absolute qualities such as omnipotence or infinite
love cannot be given in human experience. So, even if there were some way in
which experiential contact with an infinite divine being could be achieved, such
a being could not be perceived or recognized as infinite.

Before moving to a reconsideration of Hick's position, a few preliminary
distinctions must be drawn. First, care should be taken to distinguish perceptual
encounters from perceptual recognitions. People frequently perceive objects that
they do not recognize. A string of specks on the horizon may be seen without
being recognized as a caravan of camels. So, for the sake of clarity, issues
surrounding the possibility of perceptually recognizing divine infinity as infinite
should be kept quite distinct from those associated with the more basic attempt
to encounter such infinity perceptually.
Second, two quite different types of perceptual encounter must be distinguished. Frequently, people see things like books or trees. In cases of this sort,
that which is perceptually encountered is sensuously presented to the observer.
Ordinarily, such acts are called perceptions and this commonplace nomenclature
will be adopted here as well. Detections contrast strikingly with perceptions. In
perceptual detections, that which is detected is not itself sensuously presented,
though its presence may be detected in the sensuous presentation of something
else. Fred Dretske provides a clear example in his description of Orfians. Orfians
are strongly magnetic, though invisible. So, while they cannot be perceived by
human beings, their presence may be detected by watching the behavior of
surrounding metal objects. 3 Less fancifully, doctors detect the presence of germs
in the sensuous presentation of symptomatic skin rashes. Since detection provides
a way in which imperceptibles may be encountered in the perception of sensibles,
'perceptual encounter' will be stretched to function as a generic term covering
both perceptions and detections in this discussion.
Finally, various sorts of perceptual objects should be differentiated. In the
course of ordinary life, people appear to perceive things as widely diverse as
physical objects, qualities, motions and states of affairs. 4 Confronted with a
marching band, bystanders may shift from observing individual players to
watching the band as a whole. They may move attention away from the color
of the uniforms to the whirl of the drumsticks. For the purposes of this discussion,
however, the range of perceptual objects can be restricted fairly narrowly to
include only beings, attributes, manifestations of beings and manifestations of
attributes.
With these distinctions in mind, it will be the burden of the following discussion
to argue, contrary to the position of Hick, that nothing in the nature of either
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ordinary human perception or divine infinity stands in the way of perceptually
detecting the presence of divine infinite beings or attributes. Furthermore, such
detections may permit the recognition of such beings or attributes as infinite.
Beyond mere detection, it also will be argued that manifestations of divine
infinite beings as well as manifestations of infinite attributes may be perceived
and even recognized as such. More tentatively, the possibility of actually perceiving divine beings or attributes that may be recognized as infinite will be
explored.
II

It might seem appropriate to begin with an investigation into the precise nature
of divine infinity. In this connection, the work of Thomas Aquinas would provide
a convenient, and classically Christian, point of departure. In his Summa Contra
Gentiles, Aquinas efficiently cataloged many of the diverse elements included
in his own reflections upon the nature of divine infinity. He argued that God
should be conceived as infinite because, among other things, he is perfect, his
nature surpasses the limitations of generic categorization, he does not depend
upon anything else for his existence, he is pure act, containing no potency, he
is a necessary being and he is the greatest conceivable being. 5
As would be expected, Aquinas tied much of his elaborate conception of God's
infinity directly to the particularities of his metaphysics. Throughout his discussion, however, he took special pains to avoid the use of grossly quantitative
ideas. As he stressed,
Since, as the philosophers teach, 'the infinite accompanies quantity,'
infinity cannot be attributed to God on the ground of multitude. For we
have shown that there is only one God and that no composition of parts
or accidents is found in Him. Nor, again, according to continuous
quantity can God be called infinite, since we have shown that He is
incorporeal. 6
Distinguishing his own position from those of previous philosophers, Aquinas
argued,
The sayings of the most ancient philosophers are likewise a witness
to this truth. They all posited an infinite first principle of things, as
though compelled by truth itself. Yet they did not recognize their own
voice. They judged the infinity of the first principle in terms of discrete
quantity .... Or they judged infinity in terms of continuous quantity . .. But, since it was shown by the effort of later philosophers
that there is no infinite body, given that there must be a first principle
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that is in some way infinite, we conclude that the infinite which is the
first principle is neither a body nor a power in a body. 7

In spite of such insistence, David Hume chose to move in a decidedly contrary
direction when he wrote,
The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good
Being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and
augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. 8
Whether Hume intended this as a recipe for constructing adequate conceptions
of divine infinity or merely as a psychological description of the way in which
people actually try to construct such ideas may be unclear. What remains clear,
however, is his explicitly quantitative thrust. He began by moving in a direction
exactly opposite to that of Aquinas.
Fortunately, for the sake of this discussion, it is not necessary to take sides
on this or any other debate over the nature of divine infinity. In the attempt to
determine whether infinite beings or attributes may be perceptually encountered
or recognized as infinite in the course of normal human experience, there is no
need to discern the essential nature of any particular infinite being or attribute.
It is not even necessary to know what might constitute some specifically Christian
conception of divine infinity. Such matters can be sidestepped altogether by
relying upon a couple of facts about human perception.
First of all, it should be noted that people may perceptually encounter and
even recognize objects without knowing, perceiving or detecting anything about
essential natures. Consider ordinary experiences of maple trees. People sometimes
see maples. 9 One thing that might be meant by this unsurprising remark is that
people occasionally see things that turn out to be maple trees. That is, they see
objects that, as a matter of fact, are maples even though for one reason or another
they are not recognized as such at the time of perception. Of course, there are
all sorts of things that might prohibit the recognition of perceived objects as
maples. A thick fog may shroud the trees, making them difficult to discern.
Perhaps the observers are unsophisticated in their knowledge of trees, knowing
enough to identify what confronts them as trees, but unable to distinguish species.
Whatever the case might be, in this first sort of perceptual encounter with maples,
percipients are confronted sensuously with things that are in fact maples, though
not recognized as such.
A second way of encountering maples involves the perception of things that
are not immediately recognized as maples, but subsequently are consciously
inferred to be maples. In this sort of case, percipients are presented with objects
that may be recognized as trees, green things, physical objects or something
else. At the moment of perception, however, they are not recognized as maples.
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Nevertheless, sufficient perceptual clues are available by which percipients may
draw the conscious inference that the objects being perceived are, in fact, maples.
Typically, in cases of this sort, percipients depend upon the presence of reliable
indicators. Sometimes such indicators provide natural clues. For instance, observers might spot certain trees, noticing the presence of specially shaped leaves.
Recalling that only maple trees bear such leaves, these observers might conclude
correctly that the trees under scrutiny are maples. At other times, the clues used
by percipients may be utterly arbitrary. For instance, as they enter an arboretum,
visitors might be told that trees with red paint blotches are maples. In their
wanderings, such visitors could see trees, notice the color of their paint blotches
and subsequently consciously infer that the specimens under observation were
maples.
A third way of perceptually encountering maples involves immediate recognition. This sort of case might be described as one in which people simply see
maple trees as maples. In contrast with the second way of encountering maples,
people who see maples in this third way do not first see objects as something
else and then subsequently consciously infer those things to be maples. Without
the aid of conscious inference, they simply see what they recognize to be maples.
There is still much controversy over the exact nature of such acts of immediate
perceptual recognition. Clearly, since they are perceptual rather than purely
intellectual acts, percipients must take advantage of certain clues or reliable
indicators that are present in their perceptual fields. Exactly which perceptual
clues are the most important ones and precisely how they are processed remains
a matter of some mystery. Some theorists are convinced that such seemingly
immediate perceptual recognitions, though lacking acts of conscious inference,
still require certain inference patterns. Various unconscious, virtually instantaneous, inferences based upon perceptual clues lie at the heart of such perceptual
recognitions. For example, with regard to maples, percipients unconsciously use
visible indicators, such as the shapes of leaves, to infer with lightning speed the
sort of tree being observed. Others hypothesize that perceptual clues are processed
by Gestalt mechanisms or elaborate neural structures. 10
Happily, for the purposes of this discussion, nothing depends upon the adoption
of any particular fine analysis of the processing of perceptual clues in such acts.
It is sufficient to note that, at times, people possess the necessary equipment,
be it inferential, purely perceptual, neural or whatever, to recognize maples
immediately as maples. For present purposes, this ability need be understood
no more specifically than as the capacity to use perceptual indicators for recognizing maples without having to rely upon conscious inference patterns.
In each of the cases described so far, maples are sensuously presented. As
would be expected, reliable indications of maples are not processed, as such, in
cases where perceived trees are not recognized as maples. When perception is
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coupled with recognition, however, reliable indicators come into play. In cases
of perceptual detection, where maples are not sensuously presented, reliable
indicators playa more pervasive role. Every perceptual detection requires some
act of recognition based upon the sensuous presentation of reliable indicators.
People never just perceptually detect. They always use perceived indicators to
detect the presence of something that is recognized, at the very least, as something
or other. Suppose all the plants at the local arboretum have been tented for
fumigation. Trees, including maples, are covered with red tents while shrubs
are shrouded in white. Unless visitors at the arboretum take tents to be reliably
indicative of the presence of something or other underneath, nothing whatever
that is concealed by the tents will be detected. This minimal realization, however,
is sufficient to permit rudimentary perceptual detections. Visitors can detect the
presence of unperceived plants by using tents as reliable indicators to infer
consciously the presence of things recognized not as plants, but merely as something or other. Should visitors be told that red tents cover only trees, the recognition involved in their detections would proceed somewhat differently. Tent
colors would be used to infer consciously the presence of things recognized as
trees. In either of these cases, if maples were concealed beneath the tents, visitors
would be able to detect the presence of maples without recognizing them as
such. Certainly, in order to be detected, the maples would have to be recognized
as something. But they might be recognized only as plants or trees rather than
as maples. Of course, if visitors knew that only maples had red covers, this
more precise information could be used for detecting the presence of maples that
were recognized as such. As in the case of perceptual recognition already considered, a little repetition might permit the conscious inferences employed in
these assorted acts of detection to be replaced by the ability to process reliable
indicators without the necessity of conscious inference.
In bringing all of this to bear upon questions regarding the possibility of
experientially encountering infinite beings or attributes, it must be stressed that
none of the ways of encountering maples just described requires any knowledge,
perception or even detection of the essential nature of maples. Presumably, if
maples have essences at all, they are tied somehow to matters of genetics. II If
botanists could be persuaded to use such terminology, perhaps they would argue
that the essential nature of maples resides in some elaborate, fairly unique,
genetic structure. Whatever botanists might say on this topic, however, it is
important to notice that ordinary percipients need to know nothing about such
matters. Even if maples should turn out to have no essential nature at all,
perceptually encountering as well as recognizing them would remain unproblematic. All that is required for perceptual encounter is the presence of maples. In
order to be perceived, maples must be sensuously presented. If they are to be
detected, something indicative of their presence must be sensuously presented
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and taken, at least minimally, as indicative of something or other. In neither
case do essences play any crucial role. If perceived or detected objects are to
be recognized as maples, reliable indicators must be processed more specifically.
Such indicators, whether processed with or without the aid of conscious inference,
need bear no special relation to essences. Of course, reliable indicators might
be produced by essential natures, as would be the case with leaf shape on the
supposition that the essential nature of maples lies in their genetic structure.
Alternatively, such indicators might be purely conventional, as in the case where
an arboretum uses red paint blotches or tents to aid visitors. Furthermore, it is
not necessary that everyone use the same indicators. Some might rely upon the
shapes of leaves or tents while others use color codes.
What has been said about perceptually encountering or recognizing objects
applies equally to encounters with attributes. 12 Some percipients, particularly
young ones, might be sensuously presented with five-sidedness, though unable
to recognize it as such. Others may consciously infer five-sidedness on the basis
of reliable indicators. Knowing that they have five fingers on each hand, they
might conclude that an observed figure is five-sided after touching each side
with a finger and noticing no leftover fingers or sides. Yet other viewers might
work toward improving their capacities of visual discrimination so that five-sidedness might be recognized as such without conscious inference. Similarly, in
cases of detection, if variously shaped objects were cloaked in red, percipients
might detect the presence of what was, in fact, five-sidedness, recognizing it
merely as some shape or other. If only five-sided blocks bore red tents, however,
those same percipients might use this additional information to detect the presence
of five-sidedness, recognizing it as such either with or without the aid of conscious
inference. In none of these cases, whether they involve perception, detection or
recognition as five-sidedness, is any knowledge, perception or detection of
essences required.
III

Once it is realized that beings as well as attributes may be perceived, detected
and even recognized quite specifically without taking recourse to essences, it is
possible to overcome one of the most important obstacles raised by Hick.
According to Hick, it is the fact that infinite divine beings or attributes are
unrestricted in some radically unlimited way that prohibits their perceptual accessibility. He concedes that human beings may perceive as well as recognize such
things as limited power or love. Because of this, a God of finite power or love
might be encountered in the course of ordinary experience and even recognized
as finite. But the very restricted and limited nature of human perception bars
perceptual encounters with infinites as infinites.
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This line of objection rests upon the conviction that infinite beings or attributes
are unrestricted or unlimited in some very fundamental, radical way. For the
sake of argument, this may be granted. In fact, it may even be conceded that
the very essence of divine infinity is connected with some type of radical lack
of restriction or limitation. The mistake to be avoided, however, lies in the
assumption that in order for infinite beings or attributes to be perceptually encountered or recognized as infinite, this fundamental or even essential feature of
unlimitedness must be encountered. As has been seen, neither perception nor
detection requires the presentation of essences. Furthermore, recognition proceeds
on the basis of reliable indicators, indicators that need bear no special relation
to essences or essential natures.
Because perceptual encounter as well as recognition can occur without reference
to essences, even if some Christian conception of divine infinity were constructed
along Humean lines and emerged as essentially quantitative, perceptual encounters or recognitions would not be prohibited. Quantitative infinites would not
have to be presented as infinitely large. They might be encountered on a minuscule
scale. Given the right indicators, such infinites could even be recognized as
unrestrictedl y large in tiny, finite presentations.
It might seem that this form of response to Hick cannot succeed unless divine
infinity can be presented in the ways in which maples or five-sidedness are
presented. Although the sheer infinity of the divine may not prohibit such presentation, Christian tradition teaches that God is incorporeal. Taking inspiration
from the work of Robert Oakes, it might be argued that
... it seems unproblematic that being incorporeal is ... a property
that God has essentially, and that the function 'X is incorporeal' entails
the function 'X is unobservable'. Hence, since 'If God exists, he is
incorporeal' expresses a necessary truth, it should be intuitively clear
that the proposition expressed by 'If God exists, he is unobservable' is
also a necessary truth. 13
Granting the acceptability of this argument, it might be claimed that the suggested
analogy between encounters with maples and encounters with God crumbles.
While maples may be encountered and recognized in the ways described, this
is because they are observable. An infinite, incorporeal God, being essentially
unobservable, cannot be so encountered. Similarly, it might be argued that since
God's attributes are incorporeal, they too are essentially unobservable. Hence,
a radical disanalogy between encounters with observables like five-sidedness
and unobservables like infinite love or power must be acknowledged.
Before conceding the cogency of these lines of objection, it must be remembered that several distinct ways in which maples and five-sidedness might be
perceptually encountered or recognized have been outlined. Each requires that
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something, though not necessarily maples or five-sidedness, be observable. When
maples or five-sidedness remain unobservable, their presence can still be detected
and their identity determined through the proper use of observed reliable indicators. So, if the proper relations among incorporeality, unobservability and the
possibility of perceptually encountering divine infinity or recognizing it as such
are to be traced, it would seem necessary to proceed more cautiously.
Consider first the problem of merely detecting the presence of divine infinity.
Since nothing of substance turns upon which divine attribute is considered,
attention can be limited conveniently to a consideration of any infinite characteristic. Take infinite love, for example. Furthermore, since nothing under consideration here depends upon the advantages of taking one sense modality rather than
another, for the sake of convenience, consider only vision. Finally, some reliable
indicator presented within the perceptual vicinity of human beings must be
assumed. Consider the emergence of early spring grass as a reliable indicator of
infinite love.
In perceptual detections, that which is detected remains unobserved. Sometimes, of course, whatever is detected is itself observable. This is the case with
concealed maples or five-sidedness. But other times, that which is detected is
by its very nature unobservable. Scientists using visible tracks on photographic
plates to detect the presence of electrons find themselves in this situation. Electrons are unobservable in principle because they are too small to reflect
wavelengths of visible light. Since even things that are essentially unobservable
may be detected, conceding the essential unobservability of either God or his
attributes does not prohibit the possibility of their perceptual detection.
If something unobserved is to be perceptually detected, a reliable indicator
must be sensuously presented. In this regard, early spring grass presents no
difficulties whatever, being an uncontroversial, perhaps even paradigmatic, perceptual object. Of course, spring grass must actually be a reliable indicator of
infinite love. But this may be accomplished in any number of ways. It might be
nothing more than an arbitrary sign of God's infinite love, similar in this respect
to red tents concealing the presence of maples or five-sidedness. More likely,
perhaps, early spring grass might be produced by God's love. In this case, it
would be more like the distinctively shaped leaves found on maples. The details
of the connection between early spring grass and infinite love are unimportant,
so long as the grass reliably indicates divine love.
In perceptual detections, percipients recognize the presence of something by
using reliable indicators. What precisely is recognized as present depends heavily
upon what the available indicators are taken to indicate. This may vary widely
from case to case. Unsophisticated percipients might take early spring grass to
indicate merely the presence of something, they know not what. In this case,
the presence of infinite love would be detected, recognized as something or
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other, but not recognized as infinite love. Other percipients, armed with more
specific information about what spring grass reliably indicates, might detect the
presence of infinite love and recognize it as such. In this latter sort of case, the
recognition of infinite love might proceed on the basis of conscious inference
or, as with more practiced observers, without requiring conscious inference.
In each of these cases, it might seem that spring grass, being a reliable indicator
of the presence of infinite love, functions also as a visible manifestation of that
love. From this natural assumption, one might conclude that, although infinite
love or an infinitely loving God may remain essentially unobservable, their
manifestations can be perceived and even recognized as such. Unfortunately,
this tempting move is slightly premature. The mere fact that something functions
as a reliable indicator of the presence of something else is insufficient to ensure
its status as a manifestation. Consider birds. Various chirpings and f1utterings
may reliably indicate the presence of birds. They also may be characterized as
manifestations of the birds. Suppose, however, that clear weather appears only
when birds are present. By functioning as an adventitious sign, clear weather
may reliably indicate the presence of birds without being a manifestation of those
birds. In order to be a manifestation of the birds, clear weather would have to
be produced in an appropriate way by the birds. Similarly, if spring grass is to
function as a manifestation of infinite love, rather than merely as an adventitious
sign, it must be produced in an appropriate way.
Of course, whether or not God produces spring grass in an appropriate way
has nothing whatever to do with human perceptual capacities. Rather, it depends
upon the nature of God's loving activities. If God were to choose to produce
spring grass appropriately, however, then it would become possible to perceive
emerging grass as a visible manifestation of infinite love. As in other cases of
human perception, manifestations of infinite love could be perceived without
being recognized as such. All that would be required is a rather rudimentary
perceptual awareness of the grass. In order to move beyond this basic level of
perceptual awareness to the recognition of spring grass as a manifestation of
infinite love, percipients would have to employ reliable indicators, indicators
not of the mere presence of that love, but rather of its manifestation. As with
any reliable indicator, such indicators might or might not be connected in any
essential way with infinite love. Furthermore, they might or might not be used
consciously. Percipients who saw spring grass as something other than a manifestation of infinite love might spot appropriate indicators in their perceptual fields
and subsequently consciously infer that the grass was, in fact, a manifestation
of infinite love. Those who processed such indicators without recourse to conscious inference would see spring grass immediately as a manifestation of infinite
love. Of course, what precisely was recognized in these assorted acts of perceptual
recognition would depend upon what the indicators were taken to indicate. They
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might be taken to indicate a manifestation of either infinite love or an infinitely
loving being.

IV
If infinite love itself, rather than just its manifestations, is to be perceived, it
must be sensuously presented. In order to be recognized as infinite love, reliable
indicators must be processed as well. Until now, the possibility of actually
perceiving divine infinity has been blocked by arbitrarily assuming that the
doctrine of incorporeality entails the essential unobservability of God and his
attributes. If this assumption is questioned, it may be possible to find ways of
perceiving and even recognizing either infinite love or an infinitely loving God.
Given the parameters of the present discussion, only the possibilities lying
within the realm of ordinary human experience will be explored. Possibilities
latent in mystical visions, nonsensuous intuitions or other extraordinary forms
of perceptual encounter will be left untouched. As a convenient point of departure,
consider the work of Richard Swinburne. In The Coherence of Theism , he depicts
certain activities of God as basic actions. According to Swinburne, a basic action
of an agent is " ... one which he performs without having to perform some
other action in order to do it."14 Furthermore, " ... God is supposed to be able
to move any part of the universe directly; he does not need to use one part of
the universe to make another part move. He can make any part move as a basic
action. "15
Suppose, then, that certain observable occurrences, such as the emergence of
spring grass, were basic actions of God. This would not necessarily mean that
God was corporeal. Dualists can concede that certain bodily movements are
basic actions of human beings while maintaining with perfect consistency that
people are essentially incorporeal spirits. Furthermore, as Swinburne notes,
claiming that certain observable occurrences are basic actions of God does not
imply that God is embodied. Embodied creatures feel disturbances in their bodies,
look out upon the world from a specifiable perspective and become hungry when
their stomachs are empty. Because embodiment involves much more than the
simple capacity to move physical parts directly, God might remain disembodied
by refusing to become entangled in these additional relationships with his world. 16
Now suppose that an infinitely loving God were to produce spring grass as a
basic action. Whether seeing that grass could count as perceiving either infinite
love or an infinitely loving God would depend upon the precise relationships
among the grass, infinite love and God. Because nothing can be perceived unless
it is sensuously presented to some percipient, it is important to realize that only
spring grass is sensuously presented in this example. Unless God can be identified
either in whole or in part with that grass, it will not be possible to perceive him.
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While pantheists might penn it such an identification, traditional theists would
seem compelled to repudiate it, thereby abandoning the possibility of perceiving
an infinitely loving being in emerging spring grass.
The possibility that a divine attribute, such as that of infinite love, might be
sensuously present in a perception of spring grass does not dissipate quite so
quickly, though it too appears problematic. Under the most natural interpretation,
infinite love might be conceived as being some relatively high level disposition or,
perhaps, some set of activated states in the mind of God. Given an understanding
of divine love along these lines, emerging grass could not be identified as all or
part of God's love. Spring grass could be produced by God out of infinite love, of
course. Under these conditions, however, infinite love itself would remain hidden
in the depths of God, leaving spring grass as nothing more than a sign, effect or
visible manifestation of divine love. While infinite love might be detectable in the
emergence of spring grass, it would not be sensuously presented.
Suppose, however, that a strictly behaviorist interpretation of infinite love were
adopted. That is, suppose infinite love were identified with some collection of
manifest behaviors. On this account, the production of spring grass could be included, quite literally, as a part of infinite love. Under this interpretation, part of
infinite love would be sensuously present in a perceptual encounter with spring
grass. Since, in ordinary human experience, attributes as well as beings may be
perceived without being apprehended in their entirety, infinite love would be perceptible in the presentation of spring grass. Obviously, it would not have to be
recognized as such. But by employing reliable indicators, percipients could either
consciously infer that grass to be infinite love or, without conscious inference,
immediately recognize infinite love in the presentation of spring grass. In the latter
case, they would simply see spring grass as infinite love.
The obvious problem with this approach to perceiving infinite love lies with
the difficulty of accepting such a thoroughly behavioristic analysis. But strict
behaviorism is not absolutely necessary. A more chastened behaviorism would do.
Suppose infinite love were not reducible totally to a collection of manifest behaviors. Perhaps only a small part of it could be so analyzed. This would be sufficient to allow that part of infinite love to be sensuously present in an experience of
spring grass. Abandoning behaviorism altogether, if some plausible analysis of
divine infinity could be developed wherein at least a part of some infinite attribute
could be identified with something perceptible, then it would be possible to find
ways in which that attribute could be perceived and even recognized as such. Without such an analysis, however, it is necessary to rest content with detections or the
perception of manifestations of divine infinity.

v
Throughout this discussion, a heavy burden has been placed upon the assumption

SENSORY PRESENTATION OF DIVINE INFINITY

15

that emerging spring grass could be taken as a reliable indicator of infinite love.
A few objections to this assumption must be faced. Probably, the most obvious
initial objection is that the selection of early spring grass as a reliable indicator
is a poor choice. Perhaps significant theological reasons for repudiating the
selection of spring grass can be found. Maybe God would be demeaned by
displaying infinite love in this way.
It is important to notice that this kind of objection is utterly misdirected.
Nothing whatever turns upon the question of whether spring grass is actually
the right choice as a reliable indicator of God's infinite love. For the purposes
of this consideration, any reliable indicator located in the perceptual vicinity of
human beings will do. The arguments offered can be modified quite easily to
suit candidates thought to be more suitable than spring grass.
Even if it is conceded that God might display infinite love in the emergence
of spring grass, this particular choice might still be rejected as a reliable indicator
on the simple grounds that, as a matter of fact, it is not reliable. Due to the
mysteries and complexities of the divine nature, infinite love is never manifested
in simple, predictable ways. While sometimes God's love is manifested in the
emergence of spring grass, in times of drought there is no reason to conclude
that the lack of grass indicates a dearth of divine love. For that matter, there
may be circumstances in which the emergence of spring grass would be an
indication of divine displeasure rather than a sign of love. In times of plentiful
hay supplies, more spring grass might be viewed as a curse rather than a blessing.
Even the location of spring grass could make a difference. Perhaps the grass
that comes up in rose gardens or com fields should be taken as a manifestation
of malevolence, rather than love. In short, due to the complexities of divine
activity, the vicissitudes of nature and other variables, early spring grass, at best,
is a very unreliable indicator of divine infinite love.
Although this thread of objection complicates matters somewhat, it does not
generate insuperable problems. Unreliable indicators can be used just as effectively as reliable ones for purposes of perceptual detection and recognition.
Certain skin rashes are unreliable indicators of measles. Some people get rashes
without having measles and measles victims display marked differences in their
susceptibility to rashes. Nevertheless, such rashes are used commonly as indicators of measles. What is required is not some general, exceptionless principle
of association between certain rashes and measles. All that is needed is some
reason to believe that some particular manifestation of a rash is indicative of
measles. In fact, when children are at just the right age and there is an epidemic
afoot, the quest for additional confirmation of measles may be unnecessary.
Under just the right conditions, it might be sufficient simply to note that there
is no reason to doubt the reliability of the rash indicator. 17
Bringing the example into closer analogy with the manifestation of divine
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love, consider the manifestation of human love. A pat on the head is an unreliable
indicator of human love. Some people love without patting and others pat without
love. Indeed, the same individual may sometimes manifest love by patting,
indicate patronizing contempt by patting or, knowing that physical contact is
embarrassing to the self-conscious, show love by suppressing the impulse to pat.
Since patting irregularly indicates human love, what is needed is some reason
to believe or, perhaps, no reason to doubt that a particular instance of patting
indicates human love. In similar fashion, as an unreliable indicator, early spring
grass need not invariably or unfailingly indicate divine love. While it may fail
as a proper indicator on many or even most occasions, it can still indicate infinite
love under conditions where there is reason to believe or, perhaps, no reason to
doubt its reliability as indicative of divine love.
This admission of unreliable as well as reliable indicators seems to demand
that something be said about the ways in which indicators are determined. How
would anyone discover whether spring grass is an indicator, reliable or otherwise,
of infinite love? Put more generally, how could percipients find out what in their
perceptual fields is indicative of what?
Strictly speaking, this last problem falls beyond the scope of issues considered
here. The present discussion has focussed upon the nature and limitations of
human perception. More specifically, attention has centered upon ways in which
divine infinity may be perceptually accessible. In the course of this investigation,
it has been found that religious percipients rely rather heavily upon information
about what reliably or unreliably indicates divine infinity. Where percipients get
such information however, is a separate question, one about the epistemology
of religious belief. Certainly, how percipients know or are justified in believing
that something indicates divine infinity is a significant, difficult question. What
must be emphasized, however, is that the analysis of perception offered here
stands entirely separate from the details of any answer that might be given.
Consider a few. It might be argued, rather simplistically, that information
about indicators is provided by revelation. Alternatively, it might be claimed
that beliefs about indicators are either properly basic or derivable from properly
basic beliefs. Perhaps it could be argued that unsophisticated believers rely upon
information provided by theological experts in the way that visitors at an
arboretum depend upon the advice of curators. '" In tum, the experts might be
thought to obtain their information in ways parallel to those by which physicists
discover that tracks on photographic plates indicate the presence of negatively
charged particles. 19 Whatever the details might be, so long as appropriate beliefs
about indicators have been obtained, percipients would be able to detect the
presence of infinite attributes or beings, either recognizing or failing to recognize
them as infinite. They also would be able to detect or perceive manifestations
of infinite attributes or beings, recognizing or failing to recognize them as such.
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Unfortunately, unless some plausible way could be found by which at least
fragments of infinite attributes or beings could be identified with something
sensuously presentable, divine infinites themselves would remain beyond the
range of human perception.
Western Kentucky University
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